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Modernism and Temporal Transformation
′Hie in且uence of Sigmund Freud's discovery of me un-
conscious has not been confined to the development of
psychoanalysis; philosophy and critical也eory in the 20m
century, for example, have attested to the huge critical
burden of Freud's analytical consideration. In particular,
Freud s proposition mat "【t】he processes of仇e system
Ucs. [unconscious] are timeless" (Freud 1953 [XIV]: 187)
has undeniably brought about a new mode of temporal-
ity in western thoughts. 1もe timeless processes of the
unconscious have nothing to do with the passage of time
which is exclusively bound up with the system of仇e
conscious: " i n me unconscious nothing can be brought
to an end, nothing is past or forgotten" (Freud 1953 [V]:
577). The unconscious system has neither beginning nor
end and is inappropriate wi仇the temporal or historical
framework.
One of the thinkers who extend Freud's somewhat in-
tuitive awareness of unconscious temporality - or intern-
porality of the unconscious - is Louis Althusser whose
celebrated and influential essay "Ideology and Ideologi-
cal State Apparatuses" (1969) bears witness to the unde-
niable trace of Freud's way of analysis. In this essay
which unfolds仇e theoretical investigation into ideology
and subject formation, Althusser deliberately exhibits an
a組nity with Freud's analysis: "I shall adopt Freud's ex-
pression word for word, and write ideology is eternal,
exactly like the unconscious"仏Ithusser 1971: 161).
Althusser realises the profound significance of Freudian
sense of "eternal", especially when he speci五es: "eternal
means, not transcendent to all (temporal) history, but
omnipresent, trans-historical and therefore immutable in
form throughout the extent of history"仏Ithusser 1971:
161). Althusser's "eternal" indicates the form omnipres-
ent and immanent in history. Both ideology and subject
defy the historical analysis not because they belong to
仇e transcendent categoiY but because their immutable
patterns do not五t in with the sense of change or pas-
sage. From血is仇eoretical argument, appears a cele-
brated phrase "always-already": "ideology has always-
already interpellated individuals as subject [...] : individu-
als are always-already subjects (Althusser 1971: 175-76).
Along with contemporary philosophy's and theoretical
血ought's acceptance of a new model of time, aes血etic
creation - in particular, novel as the temporal form of
work - has begun to undertake an enormous project to
五nd an alternative to仇e chronological mode of narra-
tive. Modernisms quest for new temporality are vari-
ously motivated: of course, Freud's discovery of仇e un-
conscious was compelling as the works of surrealism
and Proust attested, Henri Bergson's duree pure mflu-
enced English writers such as T. E. Hulme, and Law-
rence Durrell calls attention to the influence of Ein-
stein's and Heisenberg's scienti丘c discovery on literary
writing. All these struggles reach their climax at the lit-
erary activity of modernism because one of仇e key
themes which have motivated its movement is how to
describe end: hence, modernist temporality is coloured
by the apocalyptic tone. The modernist straggle wi仙
time and its apocalyptic imagination are readily found in
representative works; for example, T. S. Eliot's poems
like The Waste Land (1922) and Four Quartets (1935-42),
Virginia Woolfs Mrs Dalloway (1925) and Waves (1931)
and James Joyce's Ulysses (1922) and Finnegans Wake
(1939).
As the works mentioned above demonstrate, signi五一
cantly, modernist preoccupation with temporality results
in me cyclic vision of time. This result proves that血e
apocalyptic imagination tends to be completed in corre-
spondence of end with beginning as Frank Kermode
states: "Apocalypse depends on a concord of imagina-
tively recorded past and imaginatively predicted血lhre"
(Kermode 1966: 8). The apocalyptic imagination intensi-
fies the homogeneity and the consistency of the organic
cycle from which it has originated: "The events derive
their sigm五cance血-0m a unitary system, not from their
correspondence with events in o血er cycles" (Kermode
1966: 5). In this sense, the relation between rectilinear
and circular view of the world does not form a sharp dis-
tinction, because they share an a仕empt to make sense of
仇e world and the time: "they 【people] need五ctive con-
cords with origins and ends, such as give meaning to
lives and to poems" (Kermode 1966: 7). Linear and cir-
cular temporality contribute similarly to coherent and
consistent narrative and仇us仇e homogeneous vision of
history.
Furthermore, both linear and circular temporality are
pervaded by an enterprise to transcend histoiY. By sub-
ordillating time to visual images,仇e recursive structure,
similar with the rectilinear temporality, secures the tran-
-115-
scending point to command time, and is obviously op-
posed wi仇timelessness in Freud's unconscious and
Bergson's duree pure: for the latter do not suppose tran-
scendence but tend to the immutable and immanent
form of history unaffected by the spatial - thus visual -
concept. Durrell's analysis a仕ributes the cyclic temporal-
ity of modernism to the dialectical identification of space
and time or "the space-time continuum" (Durrell 1952:
26; 29), which is, in fact, nothing but subordination of
time to space or spatialization of time. This modernist is-
sue of temporality is insigh帆illy recognised by Wynd-
ham Lewis (Lewis 1993: 250; 408-418); Bergson would
have criticised it as mathematical appropriation of time
as a fourth dimension. It is not wrong to think, there-
fore, that modernist cyclic temporality tends toward his-
toncal transcendence, which is bu仕ressed by visual im-
age as well as by coherent representation of time.
Beckett : Beginning and End
It is plausible to categorise Beckett as a modernist
writer since his writing shares the quest for new and
non-chronological temporality wi血modernist enterprise
and indeed his texts bear witness to predominance of
仇e apocalyptic idea. In Beckeげs works, like modernist
writing, end and beginning never constitute the opposi-
tional extremes which demarcate linear temporality; but
both are inseparably juxtaposed, which makes his works
mcongruent with application of linear narrative. The rea-
son why the end is impossible is not that it has not yet
come; Becke仕seems to underline the ubiquitous and
omnipresent nature of end. It does not signify, however,
that Beckett's writing五ts in with the circular form of
time because he dislocates the dichotomy and the corre-
spondence of beginning and end.
The short radio drama Cascando (1962) exhibits a
typical Beckettian description which the intemporal
structure, and the dislocation of beginning and end
bring about:
story - if you could丘nish it... you could rest
… sleep … not before... oh I know … the ones
… Ive丘nished　…　thousands and one　…　all I
ever did... in my life... with my life... saying
to me …五nish this one... its the right one
血en rest … sleep... no more stories … no more
words … and負nished it … and not the right
one... couldn't rest... straight to myself... fin-
ish this one … then rest... this time.‥ it's the
right one... this time... you have it... and fin-
ished it … and not the right one … couldn't rest
… straight away anomer … but this one … it's
different... I'll丘nish it... I've got it …
(Becke仕1986: 297)
In this passage, ends are so pluralized and multiplied
("I've丘nished... thousands and one") that "the right
one" cannot be identi丘ed. Moreover, repetitive emphasis
on the act of "丘nishing" also underlines me dissimula-
tion of end. In the world which simulates and dissimu-
lates end to the point of flooding multiple possibilities,
inevitably, the notion of true end cannot be maintained.
As a result,仇e distinctions between the complete and
仇e incomplete and between the beginning and也e end
become so invalid that nothing can prevent the story"
(Beckett 1986: 297) from multiplying infinitely.
This Becke仕ian sense of ending is extensively and
suggestively elaborated in one of his short prose works,
"For to end yet again" whose title already problematises
the act of ending as well as frustrates the notion of end.
A contradiction inherent in its title consists in its implica-
tion of repeatability of ending, as Leslie Hill astutely de-
scribes: `rHie title of `Pour丘nir encore'could stand as a
mo批I of Becke仕'S丘ctional corpus: a text which must be-
gin yet again in order to end, and end血at is merely
prior to a new beginning. The notion of `ending again is
typically paradoxical" (Hill 1990: 143). Hill's explication
succinctly illuminates the paradoxical nature implied in
the phrase "pour finir encore". Although I agree with
him in minking that an end is repeatable, I cannot ac-
cord with Hill's embrace of concatenation of an end with
"a new beginning whereby the circularity of beginnings
and ends is inevitably formulated.
"For to end yet again", similar with Beckett's contem-
porary works, consists of fragmental images which defy
narrative coherence, and in fact its description is more
chaotic than the circular丘)rmulation. Its discrete pas-
sages communicate the visionary impenetrability and the
obscurity of boundaries. ′ITie following passage, for ex-
ample, illustrates an arrested vision and an obscure血-on-
tier dividing between the neutral tint and whiteness:
"Grey dust as far as eye can see beneath grey cloudless
sky and血ere all at once or by degrees mis whiteness to
decipher" (Beckett 1995: 244-45). This passage centres
on imperceptibilify of gradation from "grey" to "this
whiteness" and uncertainty of change: "all at once or by
degrees". This arrested sense of changing is accented
by the reiterated phrase "verge upon verge" (Beckett
1995: 244; 246) which announces the blurring of border-
lines to disrupt the order of亜gure and ground. By blur
ring divisions and changes, "For to end yet again" dem-
onstrates in丘nite inversion of inside and outside.
The impossibility of perceiving change and gradation
is applied to the issue of the temporal sense in "For to
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end yet again". What this prose text depicts is not the
concatenation of beginning and end but the confusion
where beginnings and ends are chaotically mixed up and
disorganised. Or rather it foregrounds the exclusion
from the beginning-ending causality, which is empha-
sised by the difficulty in五tiding the clear starting point:
"Long thus to begin till the place fades followed by the
board long after"; "Grey cloudless sky grey sand as far
as eye can see long desert to begin" (Beckett 1995: 243
【my italics]). ′The description of the vast desert an-
nounces that the story has not yet even started and im-
plies intemporal barrenness which disregards not only a
chronological order but also the boundary dividing be-
ginning and end. The "grey" world,血erefore, instead of
offering a virgin moment prior to the beginning of the
temporal development, provides the inseparable and dis-
orderly agglomeration of beginnings and ends.
In Beckett's works, therefore, the infinite multiplica-
tion of beginning and end is incongruent not only wi仙
neither linear narrative structure but also with the mod-
ermst recursive structure, which would eventually shape
the historical transcendent motive. Rather Beckettian
writing problematises any shape of time: it de丘es histori-
cal inquiry to identify beginning and end, and thus em-
braces the omnipresent, trans-historical and intemporal
form. In this sense, Beckett's intemporality exhibits a
clear a皿nity with Althusser's proposition that "individu-
als are always-already subjects" (Althusser 1971: 176).
Just like the invertible relation of ground and figure -
grey" and "whiteness" - in "For to end yet again", be-
ginnings and ends are only de丘ned by their reciprocal
differences but the process of their permutation cannot
be clearly perceived. End is already always there: it is
immanent in beginning, although beginning has not yet
started.
Endgame : limitation of Language and Intemporal
Moment
Beckett's creative exploration of time culminates in End-
game (1950-56). In this play which is said to be the
author's favorite play, Beckett explores his unique imagL
nation on end and apocalypse. The difficulty which End-
game presents might be measured both by Beckett's ef-
forts devoted to composing it and by the structural
changes he made during composition: while五rstly Beck-
ett conceived it as a two-act play, the丘nal version turned
out to be a one-act play. This revision interestingly is
parallel to the structural transformation from Godot to
Endgame. The change from a two act-play to a one act-
play, we need to note, means abandoning the repetition
of two almost identical acts (Godot) in favor of the meta-
theatrical structure {Endgame). Due to this change, the
division and repetition by the two acts are so internal-
lsed in也e sequence of the one act as to cause an inter-
nal dual structure, that is, a play within a play, which
would be a dominant characteristic of Becketts later
plays. It is thus necessary for us to recognise a new di-
mension of end and apocalypse caused by the structural
change. In this respect, Endgame at the same time ex-
tends the problematics of也e preceding works and
marks a point of departure in Beckett's theatrical writ-
ings. In the following discussion, we will trace Becke仕's
exploration into me condition of ending and examine
how his apocalyptic imagination affects the structure of
Endgame.
Now critics have begun to throw a new light on Beck-
ett by connecting his texts with the debates in the Irish
postcolonial context. Endgame has also provided a good
opportunity for an application of postcolonial theoiy tO
Beckeげs writing. Neil C. Pearson's "`Outside of Here
It's Death': Co-Dependency and the Ghosts of Decoloni-
zation in Beckett's Endgame" (2001), for example, de-
bates postcolonial elements in Endgame on the basis of
the discussion of the power politics of the coloniser and
仙e colonised. Similar wi仇仇e preceding criticisms on
仙e political aspect of this text, however, this approach
丘nally reduces Endgame to a system of metaphors
which refer to a larger problematics such as "Irish his-
tory" (Pearson 2001: 222-3). Such a reading apparently
contradicts the aumor's intention, since it is to血e sym-
bolic and reductive process based on metaphor and alle-
gory that Beckett's texts stubbornly express resistance.
It is well known that Becke仕disapproved仇e radical ad-
aptation of this play. Is it not because he dismissed仇e
metaphorical interpretation? Did he not reject reduction
of Endgame to a symbolical and unitary meaning? What
is needed ths is to read Endgame without metaphor: nei-
ther reducing it to symbolically uni且ed meaning nor to
an allegorical contextualisation.
Endgame, like other works of Beckett, exhibits anach-
ronical temporality by openly displaying血蝣om the outset
the sense of ending. While Godot starts with Estragon's
phrases "Nothing to be done" (Becke仕1986: ll) and
Murphy with "the sun shone, having no alternative, on
the no仇ing new" (Becke仕1938: 5), Clove s passage in-
augurates Endgame: "Finished, it's丘nished, nearly五n-
ished, it must be nearly丘nished" (Becke仕1986: 93) to
announce the feeling of exhaustion: the play admits that
it starts血･om me (almost) nothing. The sense of ending
is also intensi五ed by many analogical examples through-
out血e play: the closed space in which the characters
con丘ne themselves, the privation of food and medicine,
and the physical disabilities and也e mutilations they suf-
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fer. Hamm, the blind anti-hero in an armchair placed in
the centre of the stage, resolutely propels仇is tendency
to more complete annihilation. The inclination toward
the absolute extermination can be con五rmed in Hamm s
frequent display of abomination of procreation: for exam-
pie, his curses at his fa血er "Accused progenitor / Ac-
cused fornicator" (Becke仕1986: 96); `'Why did you en-
gender me?" (Becke仕1986: 116) and his horror at a
flea: "humanity might start from there all over again"
(Beckett 1986: 108). Hamm's and Clove's efforts seem to
be the attempt to subsume all the elements into the en-
tropic movement toward the absolute exhaustion. In this
respect, Endgame can also be understood as concretely
presenting the early Beckett's aesthetics manifested in
"Three Dialogues" (1949) : the realisation of "the ultimate
penury" (Beckett 1965: 122).
Beckeげs works cannot be, however, oriented in a uni-
tary signi五cance. In his texts, basically, one desire is
counterbalanced with another and也e multiple tenden-
cies are so dispersed as to subvert the unitary orienta-
lion. Endgame is no exception because Hamm some-
times divulges the ambivalent attitude toward end.
Hamm s following passage in the first scene, for exam-
pie, uncovers his hesitation to advance on ending:
...] Enough, it's time it ended, in the refuge
too. [Pause.] And yet I hesitate, I hesitate to...
to end. Yes, there it is, it's time it ended and
yet I hesitate to - [heyawns] - to end. [Yawns.]
God, I'm tired, I'd be be仕:er off in bed.
(Becke仕1986: 93)
Hamm s fluctuation results血-om the difference between
his recognition of仇e situation ("it's time it ended") and
his wavering intention ("I hesitate [...] to end"). Al-
though the situation is " [ejnough", something is missing
which makes Hamm decide to end. As Becke仕says m
his le仕:er to Alan Schneider an America director (dated
21 Nov. 1957), in Endgame "'end'is stronger than 'die
(Beckett and Schneider 1998: 22). Beckett stresses that
end is not the goal to be attained at the extremity of life;
it is beyond life and death. Endgame thus suspends
status of ending and takes end out of joint from life-
death sequence.
The sense of arrested ending pervades all aspects of
Endgame: its language as well as the temporal structure
a仕ests to its influence. For example, the dialogues be-
tween Hamm and Clov, which are frequently disarticu-
lated and opposed to logical progression, contribute at
once to disclosing the uncertainty of words and to en-
hancmg血e feeling of血e suspense:
H: Yesterday! What does that mean? Yesterday!
C: [Violently.] That means that bloody awful
day, long ago, before this bloody aw血.1 day.
I use me words you taught me. 班 mey don't
mean anything any more, teach me others.
Or let me be silent.
(Becke仕1986: 113)
The semantic dysfunction of "yesterday" reflects the
temporal structure of Endgame and announces the col-
lapse of the chronological order emblematic of Beckett's
払eatrical works, which, doubtlessly, echoes Pozzo's ex-
clamation in Godot: "one day, is that enough for you,
one day like any o也er day" (Becke仕1986: 83). Pozzo's
desperate cry of "one day" quali五es血e typical Becket-
tian moment which agglutinates all仇e events wimout
temporal differentiations and in particular fuses all the
pa仕erns of beginnings and ends: `rThey give birth astride
of a grave, the light gleams an instant,血en it's night
once more" (Beckett 1986: 83). Clov's nihilistic state-
meat is also an inevitable consequence of dismissal of
the chronological articulation and, in this sense, reflects
the intemporal structure of Endgame.
The collapse of language is one of me key elements
which have pervaded literary movements since modern-
ism: what has been called "the theatre of the absurd" in
me 1950s also bears witness to仇e tendency. Similar
with Beckett's theatrical works, the theatre of Eugene
Ionesco or Harold Pinter describes the breakdown of the
relationship between language and the objective world
and stresses the tendency toward the objectification of
words. Ionesco and Pinter, on the one hand, foreground
仇e comical and mechanised iteration of也e msigm五cant
and ceremonious words such as cliches, ridiculing the
bourgeois language as nonsense. 'rheir critical insight
into language is, however, paradoxically permeated by
the inverted movement to language's universality and its
ultimate authority. The absurd exploration promotes not
the destruction but the reinvention and reshape of lan-
guage as Ionesco states:
To the extent that a poet feels that the Ian-
guage no longer corresponds to reality, no
longer expresses a truth, he must endeavour to
capture reality, to express it between, in a way
血at is more pungent, more eloquent, clearer,
more apt and precise.
(Ionesco 1964: 48).
The absurdist condemnation of bourgeois language thus
never doubts the fundamental validity of language;
ra血er it persistently holds血e belief in血e universal
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authority of language.
Becke仕goes further血an仇e absurd a仕empt to reno-
vate language by focusing on the word in dissolution. In
All That Fall (1956), Maddy Rooney speaks with "a
dead language" (Beckett 1986: 194) and, in Waiting for
Godot (1948-9), Vladimir and Estragon are surrounded
by "All the dead voices" (Beckett 1986: 58). Especially in
Happy Days (1960-61), the immobile heroine, Winnie,
frequently complains that "words fail" (Beckett 1986:
147; 148; 151; 162) and consoles herself by speaking "in
the old style" (Beckett 1986: 146; 147; 151; 156; 157; 160;
162). Beckett's difference from the absurdist dramatists
is that his writing never ceases to evoke仇e tenacious
nature of language. Although Beckett's language is in
dissolution, it is not dead but dying: or rather, Becket-
tian language is suspended between dead and dying,
stressing me tension of transitional and stretched-out
temporality before the end. In Beckett's dramas, then,
language and time is in血e mu山al relation. Just as lan-
guage is not dead but just dying, so Becke仕's time is in
the endless process toward end.
As Ionesco's statement仇at "contemporaneity does
not conflict with timelessness and universality: on the
contrary, it is subservient" (Ionesco 1964: 29) clearly il-
lustrates, his absurdist a仕empt is inspired by dialectical
integration between "contemporaneity" and "universal-
lty. This absurdist dialectical and somewhat Baudelarian
integration of temporality is similar with "timelessness"
in Freud's analysis of也e unconscious and Althusser's
也eoretical consideration on ideology and subject, but
must be decisively distinguished from Beckett's time.
While Ionesco's absurd description of the deteriorating
process of language is oriented toward an alternative
model of ideal language, Beckeげs act of writing is based
on the irredeemable but endless progress of language
toward dissolution, which of course has nothing to do
with the ideality and the authenticity of language. In
Endgame, for example, Clov demands another alternative
language (Becke仕1986: 113), but仇is cannot be under-
stood as the desire for another language. As "other
words" are exchangeable with "silent" ("teach me others
[other words]. Or let me be silent" 【Becke仕1986: 113]),
Clov's demand is血e ironical expression of an impossi-
ble aspiration for the impersonal state of language. Re-
gardless of correspondence with reality and universality,
Beckett's orientation toward silence implies the dis-
missal of the notion of historical temporality as it is a
pure movement wi也out a goal.
Language is not dead but dying. It is misleading to un-
derstand that Beckett's works are deprived of meanings;
simply血ey are dislocated. Becke仕is not motivated by
仇e absurdist purpose to restore the co汀ect correspon-
dence between the words and the objects but by the fur-
ther impulse to escape any work of signification:
H: We're not beginning to … to … mean some-
thing?
C: Mean something! You and I, mean some-
thing! [Brieflaugh.] Ah that's good one!
H: I wonder. [Pause.】 Imagine if a rational be-
ing came back to ear血, wouldn't be liable
to get ideas into his head if he observed us
long enough. [Voice of rational being. ] Ah,
good, now I see what it is, yes, now I under
stand what they're at! [CLOV starts, drops
the telescope and begins to scratch his belly
with both hands. Normal voice. ] And without
going so far as that, we ourselves... [with
emotion]... we ourselves... at certain mo-
ments … [Vehemently.] To think perhaps it
won't all have been for nothing!
(Beckett 1986: 108)
′This dialogue remarkably demonstrates血at Hamm and
Clov's intention toward "nothing" is incessantly destabi-
lised by their underlying anticipation of the emergent
possibility of messages being generated. The "rational
being" not only represents Hamm's and Clovs fear of
the inexhaustible possibility of signi五cation; more impor-
tantly it suggests the uncontrollable and inhuman as-
pects of meaning. The semantic constitution is inhuman,
because it is not what Hamm and Clov can produce and
manipulate but what is unexpectedly forced on them
か0m an exterior realm. Although qualified by negative
terms such as "zero" (Beckett 1986: 94; 106; 107),
"death" (Becke仕1986: 96; 126), "o血er hell" (Becke仕
1986: 104) or "In丘nite emptiness" (Beckett 1986: 109),
merefore, the outside does not mean "no仇ing" which
annihilates any meaning but, on the contrary, the origin
of the signifying organisation or the ine:dIaustible re-
source of meaning.
By demonstrating the characters'perverse dialogical
exchanges and their horror of signi五cation, Beckett
stresses血e unmanageable natures of meaning and lan-
guage. In his excellent essay "Ending the Waiting Game:
A Reading of Beckett's Endgame", an American philoso-
pher Stanley Cavell develops血e Becke仕Ian issue of
meanings血-0m the perspective of a也eological argu-
ment. Cavell emphasises Hamm's dilemma caused by
his subrogation of God's responsibility: that is, un-
creation of the world and meanings. Hamm's dilemma
is也us enhanced by me impossibility of even disposing
language which,血ough ta仕ered and dissolved, bears




lもe tenacious and inhuman nature of sign formation
makes more prominent Beckett's difference from ab-
surdist writers. The negative discourses which permeate
the absurdist texts are not incompatible wim也e univer
salism of semantics. The fact that their undertaking is a
dialectic movement toward "universality" (Ionesco 1964:
29) asserts their affinity with the rhetorical五gures of
symbolisation and allegorisation. The petit bourgeois in
Ionesco's plays, for example, is "not a class belonging to
any being that exists in all societies" but a metaphor for
"a manipulated man" (Ionesco 1964: 67). Beckeげs texts
are, on仇e contrary, moroughly pervaded by his abomi-
nation of rhetorical operations. It is well known that
Beckett dismisses any possibility of symbolic and alle-
gorical interpretations, as his 1943-4 novel Watt loudly
dictates the intention of the author: "no symbol where
none intended" (Beckett 1953:255). In Proust (1930) as
well, Becke仕criticises血e process of allegory in Dante:
"Dante　…　could not prevent allegory血-om becoming
heated electrified into anagogy" (Beckett 1965: 79-80).
Obviously, what repels Becke仕in symbol and allegory is
their implication of conceptual thinking and dialectical
logic.14
In contrast with a number of critical comments on
Beckett's dismissal of symbol and allegory, little atten-
tion has been given to his preference of "analogy". Beck-
ett's concern with "analogy", in fact, started with the
early stages of his literary career and developed into one
of his motivations toward writing. Questions thus arise:
why does Beckett appreciate "analogy"? What are differ-
ences between "analogy", and "symbol" and "allegory"?
Beckett's五rst published critical writing "Dante... Bruno.
Vico‥ Joyce" (1929) already witnesses his remarkable in-
terest in "analogy":
This early inability to abstract血e general血･om
the particular produced the Type-names. It is
the child's mind over again. The child extends
the names of the丘rst familiar objects to other
strange objects in which he is conscious of
some analogy. The五rst men, unable to con-
ceive　也e abstract idea of `poet' or `hero',
named every hero after the丘rst hero, every
poet ;此er the丘rst poet.
(Beckett 1983: 25 [my italics])
Moreover, similarly in Proust (1930), Beckett uses the
word "analogy for qualifying the working of "involun-
tary memory :
But if, by accident, and given favourable circum-
stances [...], if by some miracle of analogy the
central impression of a past sensation recurs as
an immediate stimulus which can be instinc-
tively identi丑ed by the subject with the model
of duplication [｣, then也e total past sensation,
not its echo nor its copy, but me sensation it-
self, annihilating every spatial and temporal re-
striction, comes in a rush to engulf the subject
in all the beauty of its infallible proportion.
(Beckett 1965: 72-3 [my italics except "by acci-
dent"])
Both passages illustrate "analogy" as not determined by
也e transcendent rule. It is an accidental working which
juxtaposes more than two things without giving abstract
and conceptual meanings, and neither enhances　仇e
value of the original - for example, the name of the五rst
hero or血e past sensation - nor dialectically subsumes
each element into higher meaning. "Analogy" is "a rush"
which undermines the condition of ontological and sub-
jective status ("to engulf the subject") and interrogates
objectivity of aesthetic judgement ("annihilating every
spatial and temporal restriction"). "Analogy" can be
therefore understood as antithetic to symbolic uni五cation
of signi五cation and totalisation of meaning. 5
Although there is no clear reference to "analogy in
the published text of Endgame, the production notebook
for 1980 London performance which Beckett directed
stresses me analogical relation of each element:16
analogy N's [Nagg's】 knocks on
lid, H's 【Hamm's] on wall
Tailor story: analogy
Voice and a仕itude with
H'S
(Gontarski 1992: 205 [my italics])
Beckett's emphasis on "analogy" suggests the lack of
clear symbolic meaning which organically and dialecti-
cally associates two terms. While Nagg's knocks on the
lid, of course, echoes Hamm's knocks on the wall, and
while仇e former s narra仕ve is analogically associated
with the tetter's, they are never dialectically sublated as
to provide us with the comprehensive and syn血etic un-
derstanding of Endgame. The ambiguous linkings of "a-
nalogy" imply the accidental coincidence and defy a con-
ceptual framework to totalise them into unitary transcen-
dent meaning. Charles R. Lyons'view cannot be advo-
-120-
cated when he states: "spectators and commentators did
not respond to their [Waiting for Godot and Endgame]
concrete materialism as tied to me objective world, ex-
cept through也e symbolism of allegory or the multiva-
lence of metaphor" (Lyons 1991: 196-97). "Analogy", con-
trary to referring to the outside of the text like a sym-
bolic reduction, just echoes and reverberates inside也e
work.17
Adorno's influential essay 'Trying to Understand End-
game" shrewdly appreciates this failure of symbolic re-
auction to the comprehensive and coherent unity of
meaning in this play: "Split off, thought no longer pre-
sumes, as the Idea once did, to be the meaning of仇e
work [Endgame], a transcendence produced and
vouched for by the work's immanence" (Adorno 1991:
243). Adorno draws a仕ention to the work's stubborn re-
sistance to仇e conceptual thinking of understanding and
intelligibility, which not only de五es me a仕empt of under-
standing what Endgame says, but also subverts the in-
verted reconstruction of meaning　血�"0m rejection of
meaning. Adorno's argument is ingeniously unfolded by
Simon Critchley into a debate on the crucial difference
of Beckett from existential philosophy. While existential-
ist absurd statements lead inversely to affirmation of
positive meaning of the negative, "[f]or Becke仕, me ab-
surd cannot be turned into a meaning for仙e meaning-
lessness of existence, for if it did so it would become
someming universal, an idea" (Critchley 1997: 149).
Cntchley's emphasis on Becke仕's tendency to avoid "an
idea" moreover contributes to interrogating也e e血ical
and political attitude of a reader of Beckett. Critchley
states mat "it is not true to say that Beckett's work is
meaningless as if meaninglessness were a fact"
(Critchley 1997: 151), because it would conceptualise
and substantiate meaninglessness, and is equivalent to
assertation of "the meaning of meaninglessness. Rather
we have to assume "a necessary and impossible task",
mat is, "a question of conceptualising and communicat-
ing mat which resists conceptualisation and refuses com-
mumcation (Critchley 1997: 151).
Adorno and Critchley indicate the way we should
take. Requiring us to read without a reductive interpreta-
tion, Beckett's texts defy our supposed effort to under-
stand them in the concept of totality and put into ques-
tion our aim of de五ning what the work says and what the
work is. Beckett's writing is a site where not only mean-
ing but also血e act of understanding are incessantly
problematised: "Understanding it [Endgame] can mean
only understanding its unintelligibility, concretely recon-
structing the meaning of the fact that it has no meaning"
(Adorno 1991: 243). Understanding is impossible not be-
cause Endgame has no meaning as seen above; but be-
cause it dislocates meaning: ``Becke仕もplays are absurd,
not because of the absence of any meaning, for then
血ey would be simply irrelevant, but because they put
meaning on trial" (Adomo 1997: 153). In me same vein,
Critchley explains that "the world [of Endgame] is over-
full with meaning and we suffocate under the combined
weight of the various narratives" (Critchley 1997: 179). It
is thus beside the mark to condemn Endgame as mean-
ingless or insigni五cant. Meanings are there血蝣0m the
outset, but are just out of joint and loosely associated
wi血each o也er by "analogy".
Compossibility of the Incompossibles
Non-dialectical process of "analogy" echoes with the in-
temporal structure of Endgame which has neither begin-
ning nor end. What is lacking for Endgame is the logical
progression and semantic organisation which contribute
to sequential temporality of narrative. Meaning and time
are alike unhinged. When Hamm states, however, that
"[tjhe end is in the beginning and yet you go on" (Beck-
e仕1986: 126), what destination is waiting for them in
this disjointed temporality?
Similar with Beckett's other work, the temporality of
Endgame fits in neither with the circularity nor with the
recurring struchre. Bersani and Dutoit seem to formu-
late a sophisticated answer by saying that "the curtain
for Endgame will always rise with a catastrophic delay",
because "everything has already been done before me
beginning of the play" (Bersani and Dutoit 1993: 39). Al一
也ough Bersani and Dutoit astutely recognise me disrup-
tion of the syntactical progression which is brought
about by me coexistence of beginning and end, their for-
mulation also reduces Beckett's non-dialectical intempo-
rality to an alternative of也e sequential progression,
namely,也e circulation. To concatenate beginning and
end leads to miss the radical implication in the passage
"the end is in the beginning" (Beckett 1986: 126 [my
italics]). What we need to consider in terms of temporal-
ity of Endgame is this status of in-ness of the end and its
immanent relation with beginning. The end in the begin-
rung means nei仙er mat it has already passed nor that it
is to come; rather it displays the disarticulated relation
between beginning and end. The irredeemably out-of-
joint time is never restored to the coherent sequence,
but on the contrary reveals the simultaneous conjunction
of discrete worlds and their incompatibility. Endgame
juxtaposes beginnings and ends which may respec tively
belong to separate narratives.
′Die intemporal status of Endgame is reflected by aim-




















































in which antinomic and incompatible oppositions are sit
multaneously juxtaposed. Beckettian paradox in this
sense shows a sigm五cant affinity to Deleuze's idea of "in-
compossibility (very different from contradiction)"
(Deleuze 1989: 130) which is elaborated血om the theo-
retical discussion of Leibniz. "Incompossibility" is not a
mere impossibil吋but is caused by juxtaposition of plu-
ral possible worlds or simultaneity of incompatible possi-
bilities. Deleuze unfolds this Leibniz's idea into the aes-
thetic notion of the genuine antinomy, by stressing the
compossibility of mcompossibles and by imagining that "in-
compossibles belong to the same world" (Deleuze 1989:
131). The antinomic power of "incompossible" thus re-
suits from the concurrence of incompatible proposi-
tions.
For all its seeming similarity, the compossibility of in-
compossibles must be distinguished from the autonomous
and "ontological" status and the emphasis on a "possible
universe" of postmodernist丘ction (McHale 1987: 10; 27) :
"an ontology is a description of a universe, not of the
universe; that is, it may describe any universe, poten-
tially a plurality of universes" (McHale 1987: 27). In post-
modernist ontological description, contradictions reside
between me universes to maintain也e consistency of
each universe. Deleuze's conjunction of incompossibles
de丘es血e postmodernist ontological account as it identi-
fies discrepancies immanent in the simultaneous juxtapo-
sition: `This is not at all a case of `each has its own
truth', a variability of content. It is a power of the false
which replaces and supersedes the form of the true, be-
cause it poses the simultaneity of mcompossible presents
(Deleuze 1989: 131 【my italics]). ′Die compossibility of
incompossibles, which cannot be consumed in Hegelian
synthetic dialectics, is an a仕empt to release仇e possible
from the concept of truth and to invest it with "a power
of the false".
Beckett had already predicted Deleuze's investigation
of the compossibility of incompossibles when his li杖le
review "An Imaginative Work! (1936) said: "The mo-
ments are not separate, but concur in a single process
(Beckett 1983: 89). It is fairly considered that this idea
culminates in Beckett's incompatible conjunction of a
grain and a heap ("Ergo:血e grain must be a heap
[Gontarski 1992: 47]) which, far from being dissolved to
illuminate transcendent meaning ("the form of the
true"), demonstrates the compossibility of incompos-
sibles. Like Beckett's own proposition, Hamm's state-
ment "血e end is in也e beginning" (Becke仕1986: 126)
informs the concurrence of the incompossibles which
can be categorised neither in linear nor circular tempo-
ral structures and which communicates neither the nihil-
istic vision of endless history nor the desperate recogni-
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tion that history has ended. Rather this is a provoking
statement to problematise me notions of history and
time.
Perception of Changes
Instead of the sequendal process of dialectics which
characterises conventional narrative, Endgames with its
indissoluble antinomy is pervaded by non-directional and
anti-onentational movements and by echoes of analogies
which reflect the out-of-joint temporality. ′The conjunc-
tion of incompossibles de丘es the concept of change, for
example, from grain to a heap or from the beginning to
仇e end. 刀le following scribble for the initial appearance
of Clov in Beckett's London production notebook an-
nounces his deliberate consideration of the nature of
change :
Head bowed in perplexity before
Going for steps
L.】
C [Clov] perplexed. All seemingly
in order, yet a change.
Fatal grain added to form impossible heap. Ra-
tio
Ruentis acervi. Last straw.
{Riverside Notebook [Gontarski 1992: 197; my
italics】)
A change happening in "ta111 seemingly / in order" em-
phasises its elusive nahre which qua!姐es Zenonian
paradox: "【f]atal grain added to form impossible heap".
In this scene, the change cannot be objectively recog-
nised or articulated but is only intuitively perceived and
reflected just by Clov's perplexed expression. Gontarski,
the editor of Endgame's Theatrical Notebooks, comments
on this direction: "it is血at sense of change which pro-
vides the impetus for Clov's speech" (Gontarski 1992:
48) but we are allowed to go further to state that all the
elements of Endgame are inevitable and analogical con-
sequences of this impossible change. The distress of
Hamm and Clov, for example, expresses仇e dilemma of
slightly sensible but imperceptible changes.
′I ne investigation into elusiveness and intangibility of
change was not an entirely new subject in Beckett's
works because this concern had already explored at
large in Watt. ′The extraordinary writing Beckett elabo-
rates in血is novel intends to problematise血e sense of
empiricism: reality can be directly comprehended nei一
也er by perception nor by recognition; rather仇e abso-
lute disbelief in these faculties motivates the narrative
impulse. Beckett's concern with problematising the
status of experience, significantly, reaches its climax
when Watt emphasises the intangible nature of changes:
"But in what did the change consist? What was changed,
and how? What was changed, if my information is cor-
rect, was血e sentiment血at a change, o血er仇an a
change of degree, had taken place" (Becke仕1953: 42).
These series of question indicate a五ssure between
sense and objective knowledge. Beckett s way of examin-
ing change也us marks a radical discommunication wi仙
Cartesian dualism of body and mind:
For my - how shall I say? - my personal system
was so distended at the period of which I speak
that the distinction between what was inside it
and what was outside it was not at all easy to
draw. Everything that happened happened in-
side it, and at the same time everything that
happened happened outside it.
(Becke仕1953: 41-2)
This passage dissolves the validity of reality into the two
discrete categories: inside and outside. Contrary to
Cartesian dualism of interiority and exteriority which
leads eventually to the privileges of the integral faculty
of the mental interiority, Becke仕emphasises血e mcom-
patible parallelism between inside and outside: "But how
did this sentiment arise, that a change other than a
change of degree had taken place? And to what if to any
reality did it correspond" (Beckett 1953: 43)? ′The paral-
lei disjunction of the real not only disregards a question
whe血er the real belongs to outside or inside but also
de五es the dialectic sublation between the dichotomies.
Beckett's interrogation explored here undeniably points
toward the horizon where incompossibles are compossi-
be.
What concerns Beckett is not to intervene the
empiricist-rationalist controversy but to maintain non-
dialectical relation between interiority and exteriority:
So I shall merely state [...] that in my opinion it
was not an illusion, as long as it lasted, that
presence of what did not exist, that presence
without, that presence within, that presence be-
tween, though I'll be buggered if I can under-
stand how it could have been anything else.
(Beckett 1953: 43 [my italics])
Instead of moving into仇e hierarchical order of仇e real-
ity, the parallel dichotomy of "presence within" and
"presence without" illuminates the difference between
them: "presence between". The dissolution of the real,
however, does not lead to an alternative of illusion ("it
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was not an illusion"); but the real is superseded by "a
power of the false" (Deleuze 1989: 131). In Watt, incom-
patible statements are therefore conjoined neither de-
grading into illusion nor dialectically sublating into truth.
Endgame extends and develops Beckett's thinking on
change and reality disclosed in Watt. The "perplexed"
expression of Clov, which is caused by "[fjatal gram", is
a re丑ection of the hiatus between intuitive perception
and recognition. This dumb mime, far from expressing
the privilege of perception over cognitive articulation,
marks an uncanny difference between perception and
recognition. The change thus understood is not a tempo-
ral conception but a sign of也e unhinged status of mteri-
only and exteriority. Reality of Endgame, therefore, con-
sists nei仇er in perception nor in objective knowledge;
but in the discrepancy between them or their incompat-
ible parallelism. The plural and even multiple仇reads
fabricating Endgame are released from the imperative of
truth. This play juxtaposes and conjoins incompatible
elements such as beginning and end, grain and heap,
and perception and recognition, wimout counterbalanc-
ing each other. ¶-ie end is me beginning and a grain
must be the heap; these propositions are of course false
but never illusion. Free血om Ionesco's artistic mind of
reconstituting the correspondence between language
and real (Ionesco 1964: 48), Beckett pushes his writing
toward reality of the false. Instead of the impulse of cor-
respondence, Endgame features the operations of anal-
ogy: the concurrence which at the same time joins and
disjoins.
By dislocating beginning and end血･om me logical pro-
gression from beginning to end, Beckett's temporal
imagination forms a remarkable and singular contrast to
modernist recurrence. Rather than historical transcen-
dence, Endgame reveals an excessiveness immanent in
the temporal sequence: "Between the beginning and the
end lies a small distinction which is that between `begin-
ning'and `end'" {Berlin Diary [quoted in Gontarski 1992:
48; my italics]). Endgame focuses on this "small distinc-
tion" which disjoins but juxtaposes beginning and end.
Due to this disjunction-juxtaposition, Beckett unhinges
end血-0m beginning, even from the narrative syntactics.
What concerns Becke仕is仇e description of the disar-
ticulated status of ruins. Even if "fatal grain [is] added to
form impossible heap" (Riverside Notebook [quoted in
Gontarski 1992: 197]), Endgame cannot relocate its own
end. Becke仕stages in血is play the elusive and uncanny
nahre of血e end which assumes the absolute ambiguity
and which cannot be exhausted by a contradiction of仇e
dilemma.
Notes
1 ¶us proposition appears in `¶le Unconscious" (1915) : `¶le
processes of the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e. they are not
ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of dme;
mey have no reference to time at all" (Freud 1953 [XIV]:
187). The timeless nahre of血e unconscious is alluded in
The Interpretation of Dream (1900) (Freud 1953 【V]: 577-
78), in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) (Freud 1953
[XVIII]: 28) and in New Introductory Lecture on Psycho-
Analysis (1932-33) (Freud 1953 [XXII]: 74).
For example, see the following passage: `Time as history
and evolution took its五rst blowかom Darwin, from geology
and archaeology. ¶me as an idea took its second great
blow Einstein. ′The one thing which differentiated the new
physics - the physics of today, that is -かom the old (Ein-
stein's血-om Newton's) is血e idea of血e nature of space
and dme and血eir relationship. Under me new仇eory
space was conceived of as being n-dimensional, with time
as the fourth of its dimensions. This completely revolution-
ized our whole a仕itude to the universe, and if we are to un-
derstand血e time-literature oりoyce and Virginia Woolf no
less than the poetry of The Waste Land, we must strike up
a nodding acquaintance with the new theory" (Durrell
1952: 23).
In his comprehensive study on modernism Fictional Death
and the Modernist Enterprise (1995), Alan Warren Fried-
man indicates也at the modernists'a仕empt at new tempo-
rality is represented by their elision of description of death
(Friedman 1995: 18-9).
See仇e arguments of Kermode (Kermode 1966: 96) and
Durrell (Durrel1 1952: 26).
5 ¶lis piece is one of the prose works wr批en in 1973-75 and
included in For to End焔t Again and Other Fizzles (1976).
Note that the titles of the books are different between the
British and American editionsr For to End Yet Again and
Other Fizzles (London: John Calder, 1976); Fizzles (New
York: Grove Press, 1976).
Becke仕devoted almost six years to its completion (S. E.
Gontarski 1992: m).
For the Irish contextualisation, see John Harrington, The
Irish Beckett (1991); Mary Junker, Beckett: The Irish Dimen-
sion (1995). For the postcolonial perspective, see David
Llyod ``Writing in也e Shit: Becke仕:, Nationalism and也e
Colonial Subject in Anomalous States: Irish Writing and the
Postcolonial Moment (1993); Declan Kiberd "Beckett's
Texts of Laughter and Forgetting" in Inventing Ireland
(1996).
For example, Sean Golden, "Familiars in a Ruinstrewn
Land: Endgame as Political Allegory" (1981); Charles R.
Lyons, "Fin de Partie/Endgame as Political Drama" (1991).
The production Becke仕strongly disapproved of is Andre
Gregory's direction, opened 8也FebruarY 1973　at New
York University, School of the Arts. Alan Schneider the
faithful American director of Beckett's plays complains:
`The trouble here is血at he is now working with a text, a
much different situation, and treating it as though it did not
exist" (Becke仕and Schneider 1998: 303). Against Gre-
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gory s production, Beckett prevented any further presenta-
tion. He says in a le仕:er to Alan Schneider dated 20 Febru-
ary 1973 "My work is not holy writ but this production
sounds truly revolting & damaging to the play" (Beckett
and Schneider 1998: 304).
1 See Martin Esslin's The Theatre of the Absurd (1980).
In The Painter of Modern Life, Baudelaire exhibits his
unique aesthetic vision: "Beauty is made up of an eternal,
invariable element, whose quantity it is excessively difficult
to determine, and of a relative, circumstantial element,
which will be, if you like, whether severally or all at once,
血e age, its fashions, its morals, its emotions" (Baudelaire
1964: 3).
For Hamm's and Clov's perverse exchange, see for exam-
pie the following dialogue: "H: Nature has forgo仕en us. /
C: There's no more Nature. / H: No more nature! You ex-
aggerate. / C: In the vicinity. / H: But we breath, we
change! We lose our hair, our teeth! Our bloom! Our Ide-
als! / C: Then she hasn't forgo仕en us (Becke仕1986: 97)".
It is fair to incite the whole passage: "Hamm's strategy is to
undo all covenants and to secure血¶itlessness. In a word,
to disobey God perfectly, to perform man's last disobedi-
ence. No doubt acts out of compassion. ("Kill him, for the
love of God.") The creation and destruction of a world of
men is too great a burden of responsibility even for God.
To remove that responsibility the world does not so much
need to vanish as to become un-created. But to accomplish
that it seems that we will have to become gods. For mere
men will go on hoping, go on waiting for redemption, for
justification, for meaning. And these claims ineluctably re-
tain God in creation - to his, and to our, damnation. And
yet, where there is life there is hope. That is Hamm's di-
lemma" (Cavell 1976: 140-41).
See for example the following passage血-om Proust: The
Baudelarian unity is a unity `postrem', a unity abstracted
from plurality. His 'correspondence'is determined by a
concept,血erefore strictly limited and exhausted by its own
definition. Proust does not deal in concepts, he pursues the
Idea, the concrete" (Becke仕1965: 79).
we can血d same tendency in his review of 1936, "血
Imaginative Work!: The Amaranthers. By Jack B. Yeats".
What Beckett focuses on in the novel of Yeats is the rejec-
tion of the reductionisra of "symbol" and "allegory" into the
essential substance which an oeuvre would suppose (Beck-
ett 1983: 90) and instead the affirmation of "analytical
imagination which suggests血e linking, but at the same
time emphasises "the discontinue" between two elements
and two moments (Becke仕1983: ). What characterises it
is the incompatible juxtaposition of association and血-ag-
mentation: the linking without synmesisation into a total-
lsed image. In this sense, the work of "analytical imagina-
tion is very similar with that of "analogy".
16 刀-is is the directory's notebook Becke仕prepared for the
Riverside Studios rehearsals of Endgame (May 1980) with
San Quentin Drama Workshop at Hammersmith, London
and reproduced in Gontarski (ed.) Theatrical Notebooks of
Samuel Beckett: Vol. 2, Endgame (1992).
Becke仕s concern wi仙"analogy" is predictive of Derrida's
"dissemination , the argument on which is unfolded m an
important essay on Mallarme `The Double Session". Der-
rida's intension of "dissemination" is to problematise仇e
metaphoric and metonymic exchanges which are based on
仇e hierarchical order of language. In these rhetorical fig-
ures, empirical description needs to be integrated mto a
higher and unitary concept. Mallarme's writing resists the
rhetorical process, Derrida stresses, because his poetry un-
dermines血e equilibrium between仇e empirical depictions
and也e abstract concept of a higher meaning: "mere is
more metaphor, more metonymy. Since everything be-
comes metaphorical, there is no longer any literal meaning
and, hence, no longer any metaphor ei血er. Since every
血ing becomes metonymical, the part being each time
greater也an血e whole and whole smaller than the part,
how could one arrest a metonymy or a synechdoche? How
could one丑x the margins of any rhetoric" (Derrida 1981:
258)?
S. E. Gontarski has in his mind the recurring structure of
the beginning and也e end, saying血at "Hamm's great fear,
however, is that仇e beginning may also be in血e end, that
existence may indeed be cyclical and suggesting也e mflu-
ence of "the Italian philosopher Giordano Bruno (Gontar-
ski 1992: 46).
See also the following passage of Hamm: "Moment upon
moment, pattering down, like the millet grains of... [he
hesitates]... that old Greek, and all life long you wait for
血at to mount up to a life" (Becke仕1986: 126).
The grain-motif recurs in Beckett's works. It丘rst appears
in Watt written intermittently from 1941 to 1944. The grain
is used here as a metaphor for an imperceptible change,
which is accumulated into a radical change (Becke仕1953:
41). This scene will be explored later in the present chap-
ter. The gram is also identi丘ed in a dramatic piece of 1958,
Krapp's Last Tape, although its implication is slightly differ-
ent from those of Watt and Endgame.
Berlin Diary is the diary which Beckett's assistant, Michael
Haerdter, kept for the Schiller-Theater Werkstatt produc-
tion of Endspiel (September 1967) and published as Uber
die Proben fiir die Berliner Auffiihrung.
As for Deleuze's elaborate argument on Leibniz's "incom-
possible , see also his The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque
(1993): in particular, 59-60.
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